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Abstract
This article advances the thesis that disciplinary proceedings may constitute a tool 
for breaking the rule of law in Poland. In 2017, as part of a package of legal changes 
to the judiciary, a disciplinary system was created in Poland to ensure that judges 
were subservient to the political will of the authorities. From the beginning, new dis-
ciplinary officers appointed by the Minister of Justice (the Prosecutor General) have 
targeted judges who disagree with unconstitutional changes to the judiciary. Disci-
plinary proceedings are by no means repressions that affect judges who demand that 
other authorities respect the rule of law in Poland. The article discusses, on a step 
by step basis, the practical mechanisms taken by the political authorities to break 
the rule of law in Poland. Particular attention is paid to the measures which have 
been taken concerning the judiciary. The article discusses the judgment of the CJEU 
on 19 November 2019 in combined cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18 and 
the implementing resolution of the combined Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social 
Insurance Chambers of the Supreme Court on 23 January 2020 as well as the col-
lapse of the rule of law in Poland from a practical perspective. The analysis of the 
recent events shows that after the so-called Muzzle Law (A bill amending the Act on 
the Organization of Ordinary Courts, the Act on the Supreme Court and the Act on 
the National Council of the Judiciary was submitted on 12 December 2019, and then 
voted on by the parliamentary majority in the lower house of the Polish Parliament 
(Sejm) on 20 December 2019.) came into force, the application of the resolution 
of the combined Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of the 
Supreme Court on 23 January 2020 implementing the CJEU judgment in the joined 
cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18 of 19 November 2019 can be and, in fact, 
is penalized by further disciplinary proceedings, which constitutes a real threat to 
the already weakened rule of law. Institutions and, above all, judges who are safe-
guarding the rule of law are being destroyed.
Keywords The rule of law · Disciplinary proceedings · Independence of the courts · 
A right of access to the courts · Definition of the notion of a court · Reform of the 
justice system
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1 Introduction
This article puts forward the notion that a proper form of disciplinary proceedings is 
a necessary element of independent and impartial courts. Independent and impartial 
courts in our opinion are active guardians of the rule of law. Furthermore, courts 
in democratic countries exercise judicial authority so that their main function is 
to ensure the right of access to a court under Art. 45(1) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland or more widely under Art. 6(1) of the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms1 or Art. 47 EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights2 and S. 19(1) Treaty on European Union,3 a right which is only possi-
ble before an independent court. Guaranteeing individuals the right to have access to 
a court as a public subjective right towards the state is one of the basic concepts of a 
democratic country. Changes to disciplinary proceedings aimed at subordinating the 
courts to the executive authorities and leading to the freezing of the functioning of 
the courts constitute a tool for undermining the rule of law and, as a consequence, 
depriving parties of the right to have access to a court. In other words, recent experi-
ences in Poland have shown that disciplinary proceedings form a means by which to 
interfere with the courts’ independence. Moreover, these changes are an element of 
dikastophobia—a dangerous strategy by the governing party aimed at preventing the 
executive and legislative powers being controlled by the judicial authority.4
2  The Rule of Law and an Independent and Impartial Court System
The concept of the rule of law is certainly not new. The concept has a strong pres-
ence in legal theory,5 in traditions and branches of political theory6 and in sociol-
ogy.7 Of course, the rule of law cannot be studied without taking historical and 
cultural contingencies into account.8 In Poland there are still strong demands for set-
tling scores from the past. Many of these grievances involve real or alleged wrongs 
which are condemned today, and rightly so, but which often had legal authoriza-
tion at the time or transgressed no existing positive laws when they were committed. 
1 Dz. U. of 1993 no. 61, Item 284 as amended.
2 Dz. U. of 2009 no. 203, item 1569, hereinafter called – CFREU.
3 OJ of EU.C.07.306.1 as amended and Dz. U. of 2004 no. 90, item 864/30 as amended hereinafter 
called - TEU.
4 M. de Werd, ‘Dikastophobia’ - a dangerous populist strategy to prevent judges from controlling gov-
ernment power, https ://europ eanco urts.blogs pot.com/2020/02/dikas topho bia-dange rous-popul ist.html.
5 For a formal conception of the rule of law see: Raz (1977), p. 195 at 196; Raz (1979); l Dicey (1959); 
Allan (1993); Arthurs (1985); Marshall (1971), p. 137; Unger (1976), pp. 176–181, 192–223. For a sub-
stantive conception of the rule of law see: Dworkin (1986); Dworkin (1985), pp. 11–16; Laws (1993), p. 
59; Laws (1995), p. 72; Laws (1996), p. 622; Bellamy (1995); Sandel (1984); Mulhall and Swift (1992); 
Irvine (1996), p. 636 at 637; Dworkin (1977); J. Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions. See also 
Craig (2016), pp. 467–487.
6 See: Markowski (2019), pp. 111–132.
7 See: Krygier and Martin (2008).
8 Selznick (2016), pp. 21–33.
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Among the potential casualties of now applying the law to these past grievances are 
what are often said to be central elements of the rule of law such as: independent 
and impartial courts.9
In what follows we deal with the rule of law as a practical ideal. Needless to 
say, this maxim is not meant to be taken literally. Rather, the decisions made by 
legal actors—legislators, judges, and other officials—should be governed by cer-
tain ideals and standards.10 We share an opinion that the rule of law means “law 
plus standards”. From one point of view, narrowly conceived, the “classical” rule of 
law is a set of negative safeguards against an abuse of power. Officials are restricted 
by constitutional constraints, procedural rules, and institutional arrangements. Fur-
thermore, such a conception is clearly supported by specific historical achievements 
and widely recognized principles of justice.11 A simple comparison between the 
elimination of the rule of law in communist times and the acceptance of only basic 
principles based on a positivist concept is not appropriate. Furthermore, a positivist 
conception12 is clearly unacceptable. The communist system collapsed over 30 years 
ago. There are no additional problems than those that existed in the 1990s, while 
completely new ones also appeared with a specific cultural background.
The rule of law will be operationalized by pointing to various institutional and 
extra-institutional aspects, taking into account the separation of powers. In recent 
years a new element has appeared in the discussion on the rule of law, the separa-
tion of powers13 and the role of independent judges. Judicial authority is exercised 
by courts and tribunals. Courts and tribunals would not be able to adjudicate with-
out judges.14 An independent court is a court that is structurally, organizationally 
and functionally separate from other public authorities. Furthermore, a sovereign 
court is a court in which impartial judges adjudicate .15 A new paradigm of the court 
assumes the existence of a court equipped with jurisdictional authority as a guaran-
tor for exercising the right to have access to a court, which is only possible before 
the court whose independence is guaranteed, irrespective of whether European law 
is or could be applied in a given case. It is consistent with the construct of the right 
to access a court constituting not only the right in itself but also a protective measure 
9 Krygier and Czarnota (2016), pp. 2–3.
10 Selznick (2016), pp. 21–33.
11 Selznick (2016), pp. 21–33.
12 See: Morawski (2016), pp. 39 – 54.
13 See: Bellamy (1996), pp. 436–456.
14 K. Gajda-Roszczynialska, A test of six conditions of the EU standard of the notion of “court” and the 
Polish administration of justice – deliberations on the basis of the judgment of Court of Justice dated 
27.2. 2018 in the case of C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses. Iustitia 2018, no. 1, http://
www.kwart alnik iusti tia.pl/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2018/10/KGR-A-test-of-six-condi tions -of-the-EU-stand 
ard-of-the-notio n-of-court .pdf A. Dąbrowski, Ustrojowa pozycja sędziego, “Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa” 
No. 1/2014, p. 8.
15 As in: K. Gajda-Roszczynialska, A test of six conditions of the EU standard of the notion of “court” 
and the Polish administration of justice – deliberations on the basis of the judgment of Court of Justice 
dated 27.2. 2018 in the case of C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses. Iustitia 2018, no. 1, 
http://www.kwart alnik iusti tia.pl/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2018/10/KGR-A-test-of-six-condi tions -of-the-EU-
stand ard-of-the-notio n-of-court .pdf.
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with respect to other subjective rights.16 The evolution of the CJEU’s opinions 
and the said approach adopted in the CJEU’s judgment of 27.02.2018 in the case 
C – 64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses17 assume the creation of a 
multi-layered notion of the court. The judgment of the Court delivered in this case 
was as groundbreaking as it was surprising, even if the outcome itself was predict-
able.18 The political objectives of the Court’s decision are clear: the CJEU wanted 
to clarify that the organization of the national judiciaries is not exclusively a mat-
ter for each of the Member States separately, but that Member States are under an 
obligation, contained in primary EU law and supervised by the Court of Justice, 
to ensure that their courts and judges are independent ‘in the fields covered by EU 
law’.19 Independence is a “constitutional” value and should be verified at the EU 
and national level.20 The concept of independence21 must, on the one hand, fulfil 
European standards, while, on the other, it has to take into account the specific status 
of a judge as provided for by national legislation, so that making this criterion pre-
cise must always be an obligation for the national courts. The notion of independ-
ence includes internal and external aspects.22 The internal aspect of independence 
is nothing but the impartiality of the judge who should keep his/her distance from 
the parties to the dispute and their interests with respect to the subject matter of the 
dispute.23 The court should be objective and should not have any interest in settling 
16 The resolution of the joined Chambers: Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chamber of 
the Supreme Court dated 23 January 2020, Case BSA I-4110-1/20, point 13, http://www.sn.pl/aktua lnosc 
i/SiteA ssets /Lists /Wydar zenia /AllIt ems/BSA%20I-4110-1_20_Engli sh.pdf.
17 Compare the discussion concerning this decision: Krajewski (2018), p. 395 et seq.; J. Barcik, Czy 
etos trzeciej władzy narusza jej więzi z Państwem Polskim?, Monitor Konstytucyjny: http://monit orkon 
stytu cyjny .eu/archi wa/3461 M. Taborowski, A breakthrough judgment: CJEU finds that is has the right 
to assess the condition of administration of justice in EU countries https ://archi wumos iatyn skieg o.pl/
wpis-w-debac ie/przel omowy -wyrok -trybu nal-spraw iedli wosci -ue-uznaj e-ze-prawo -oceni ac-stan-wymia 
ru-spraw iedli wosci -panst wach-ue/; P.M. Van den Eijnden, AB 2018/220 - HvJ EU 27 February 2018, 
C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses/Tribunal de Contas - Noot, Administratiefrech-
telijke beslissingen; Rechtspraak bestuursrecht 2018 nº 26 pp. 1387–1390; L. Coutron, Observations 
à l’arrêt du 27 février 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses contre Tribunal de Contas, 
affaire C-64/16, Jurisprudence de la CJUE 2018. Décisions et commentaires 2019, pp. 237–246; Cou-
tron (2018), pp. 1417–1434; Simon (2018), pp. 11–12; Miglio (2018), pp. 421–431; Barcik (2018), pp. 
23–29; García-Valdecasas Dorrego (2019), pp. 75–96; Miglio (2018), pp. 421–431; Pech and Platon 
(2018), pp. 1827–1854.
18 Bonelli and Claes (2018), p. 622.
19 Bonelli and Claes (2018), p. 623.
20 See: Coutron (2019), pp. 1417–1434; Simon (2018), pp. 11–12; Miglio (2018), pp. 421–431; Barcik 
(2018), pp. 23–29; García-Valdecasas Dorrego (2019), pp. 75–96; Miglio (2018), pp. 421–43.
21 See: K. Gajda – Roszczynialska, A test of six conditions of the EU standard of the notion of “court” 
and the Polish administration of justice – deliberations on the basis of the judgment of Court of Justice 
dated 27.2. 2018 in the case of C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses. Iustitia 2018, no. 
1, http://www.kwart alnik iusti tia.pl/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2018/10/KGR-A-test-of-six-condi tions -of-the-
EU-stand ard-of-the-notio n-of-court .pdf Compare in the aspect of the meaning of independence: Mokry 
(1985), p. 217. See also: Kosař (2017), pp. 96–123; Kosař (2016), pp. 23–142.
22 As in the judgement of the CJ on 16.2.2017 in the case of C-503/15, OJ of EU C dated 2017 no. 126, 
point 71; dated 19.9.2006 in the case of C 506/04, OJ EU C of 2006 no. 587, point 50.
23 Compare the judgment of the CJ on 16.2.2017 in the case of C-503/15, OJ of EU C dated 2017 
no. 126, point 72; dated 19.9.2006 in the case of C-506/04, OJ EU C of 2006 no. 587, point 52; dated 
22.12.2010 in the case of C-517/09, OJ EU C of 2010 no. 821, point 40; similarly the judgment of the 
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the dispute in any specific way except by means of a strict application of the law.24 
The external aspect of independence assumes that the adjudicating body is protected 
against any intervention and external pressure which risks the independence of its 
judgments.25 A necessary element of the external aspect is the correct formation of 
disciplinary proceedings so that they can fulfil their functions but not constitute a 
tool for exerting pressure on adjudicating bodies leading to their dependence on leg-
islative and executive powers.
In this context it is beyond any doubt that one of the elements for ensuring the 
courts’ independence is a proper form of disciplinary proceedings. Furthermore, 
there can be no doubt that an improper form of disciplinary proceedings may cre-
ate a tool for limiting the independence of judges. In other words, the CJEU trans-
formed a case that initially seemed to be about the judicial review of an austerity 
measure into a decision on the organization of the European judicial system.26 That 
is why disciplinary proceedings should meet certain standards. This mechanism was 
used in the case of Commission v Poland (independence of the Supreme Court).27 
Moreover, the CJEU has established its jurisdiction regarding the adoption of an 
interim measure as an instrument to ensure respect for the rule of law in Poland.28 
The European Court of Justice’s order in Case C-791/19 R29 is the third time that the 
26 Bonelli and Claes (2018), p. 623.
27 ECJ 24 June 2019, Case C – 619/18 Commission v Poland (independence of the Supreme Court), 
EU:C:2019:531. See: Kmieciak (2019), pp. 143–150; Filipek (2019), pp. 4–14; Taborowski (2019), pp. 
15–25; Świątkowski (2019), pp. 7–22.
28 See: ECJ 20 November 2017, Case 441/17 R, Commission v Poland (Puszcza Białowieska) 
EU:C:2017:877; ECJ 24 June 2019, Case C – 619/18 Commission v Poland (independence of the 
Supreme Court), EU:C:2019:531.
29 See ECJ 8 April 2020, European Commission v Republic of Poland., Case C-791/19 R.
 EU:C:2020:277.
CJ on 6.7.2000 in the case of C-407/98, OJ EU C of 2000 no. 367, points 34–37; decision of CJ dated 
14.5.2008 in the case of C-109/07, OJ EU C of 2008 no. 274, point 24.
Footnote 23 (continued)
24 As in: K. Gajda – Roszczynialska, A test of six conditions of the EU standard of the notion of “court” 
and the Polish administration of justice – deliberations on the basis of the judgment of Court of Justice 
dated 27.2. 2018 in the case of C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses. Iustitia 2018, no. 
1, http://www.kwart alnik iusti tia.pl/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2018/10/KGR-A-test-of-six-condi tions -of-the-
EU-stand ard-of-the-notio n-of-court .pdf. Compare the judgments of the CJ dated 19.9.2006 in the case of 
C506/04, OJ EU C of 2006 no. 587, point 52; dated 6.6.2000 in the case of C-407/98, OJ of EU C dated 
2000 no. 367, point 32.
25 As in: K. Gajda – Roszczynialska, A test of six conditions of the EU standard of the notion of “court” 
and the Polish administration of justice – deliberations on the basis of the judgment of Court of Justice 
dated 27.2. 2018 in the case of C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses. Iustitia 2018, no. 1, 
http://www.kwart alnik iusti tia.pl/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2018/10/KGR-A-test-of-six-condi tions -of-the-EU-
stand ard-of-the-notio n-of-court .pdf Compare the CJ judgments dated 16.2.2017 in the case of C-503/15, 
OJ of EU C dated 2017 no. 126, point 74; dated 19.9.2006 in the case of C-506/04, OJ EU C of 2006 
no. 587, point 50 and 51; dated 22.12.2010 in the case of C-517/09, OJ EU C of 2010 no. 821, points 
39; decision of CJ dated 14.5.2008 in the case of C-109/07, OJ EU C of 2008 no. 274, point 23; dated 
6.6.2000 in the case of C-407/98, OJ EU C of 2000 no. 367, point 34. See the similar judgements of the 
CJ dated 4.2.1999 in the case of C-103/97. p. I-551, point 21; dated 6.7.2000 in the case of C-407/98 p. 
I-5539, point 36; see also the judgement of ECHR dated 28.6.1984 in the case Campbell and Fell versus 
United Kingdom, A series no. 80, §78.
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Court has granted interim measures that have been applied for by the Commission 
so as to preserve the rule of law in Poland .30
This judgment created a new dimension in the significant and active role of the 
courts in protecting the rule of law in the EU legal order. For a long time Article 2 
TEU seemed to be nothing more than a mere proclamation of values with only lim-
ited implications (Article 7 TEU). It is generally argued that a violation of Article 2 
TEU cannot itself be a ground for judicial action.31 Respect for the rule of law has 
always played an important role in the case law of the CJEU. References have been 
made to the principles of legality, legal certainty, the prohibition of arbitrariness in 
executive powers, the right to a fair trial before independent and impartial courts, 
the separation of powers and equality before the law. The cornerstone is a “Union 
based on the rule of law”. The strengthening of the EU’s core values with the Treaty 
of Lisbon and the rule of law backsliding in certain EU member states provided the 
context against which the Court is increasingly discovering the potential of Article 
2 TEU, in conjunction with Article 19 (1) TEU, for ensuring respect for the rule of 
law in the EU legal order.32
Of course, the aspect of the separation of powers and the rule of law is very 
important, but we are in full agreement with Martin Krygier on the issue of the 
essence of the matter in question. What about institutional and extra-institutional 
aspects of the rule of law in Poland? Do we really have the rule of law in Poland? 
Does the law still really matter?
3  The So‑Called Reform of the Justice System in Poland (2015–2020)
Respect for the rule of law has always played an important role in the EU, particu-
larly in the case law of the CJEU. References have been made to the principles of 
legality, legal certainty, the prohibition of arbitrariness in executive powers, the right 
to a fair trial before independent and impartial courts, the separation of powers and 
equality before the law.33 The cornerstone is a “Union based on the rule of law”. The 
member states should protect the structure and functioning of the EU legal order 
and especially the rule of law. On the other hand, in Poland in the last few years 
we can see a so-called “rule of law backsliding”. Rule of law backsliding has been 
defined by Pech and Schepple as “the process through which elected public authori-
ties deliberately implement governmental blueprints which aim to systematically 
weaken, annihilate or capture internal checks on power with the view of dismantling 
the liberal democratic state and entrenching the long – term rule of the dominant 
30 See: L. Pech, Protecting Polish Judges from the Ruling Party’s “Star Chamber” The Court of Justice’s 
interim relief order in Commission v Poland (Case C-791/19 R), 9 Apr 2020; https ://verfa ssung sblog .de/
prote cting -polis h-judge s-from-the-rulin g-party s-star-chamb er/.
31 Kochenov (2013), p. 148.
 2 Kochenov and Pech (2015), p. 520; Müller (2015), p. 141 at p. 145.
32 Van Elsuwege and Gremmelprez (2020), p. 31.
33 Van Elsuwege and Gremmelprez (2020), p. 25–26.
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party”.34 In Poland in 2020 the collapse of the rule of law continues.35 Since October 
2015 the governing Law and Justice Party has been engaged in a so-called reform of 
the justice system in Poland.
The first safeguard that was eliminated by politicians was the Constitutional Tri-
bunal. In transgressing the law as it stands (Art. 190 para. 2 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Poland, henceforth the Polish Constitution), the rulings of the Tribu-
nal in 2016 were not published until two years later (on 5 June 2018), when Poland 
thus made concessions in its dispute with the European Commission. This was done 
with a caveat that the rulings were issued in violation of the provision of the Act of 
25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal, and that they were with reference to 
“a normative act that had lost its binding power”.36 The crisis was initiated in the 
autumn of 2015 and concerned the election of three judges of the Constitutional Tri-
bunal by Parliament to the replace the judges already duly elected.37 The President 
refused to take the oath from those judges who had been properly elected,38 and they 
were therefore not allowed to take office. The Sejm (the lower chamber of the Polish 
Parliament) elected other judges in their place – referred to as stand-ins (doubles). 
They themselves said that they represented the government.39 Three other judges 
who had just been elected were not allowed to take office.40 The new president of 
the Constitutional Tribunal, Julia Przyłębska,41 and Mariusz Muszyński, the person 
whom she had appointed as her substitute with no justification, shuffled the panels 
of judges hearing cases according to their own liking.42 The new judges themselves 
examined the cases pertaining to the lawfulness of their own appointment, thereby 
completely ignoring the principle of nemo iudex in causa sua. The president of the 
Constitutional Tribunal expressed her own opinions on the constitutionality of the 
Act on the public television service. The Acts enacted in 2015 and 2016 regulate 
the Constitutional Tribunal in such a way that it violates the Constitution. This all 
resulted in constitutional bodies such as the Disciplinary Officer, the National Coun-
cil of the Judiciary and the First President of the Supreme Court withdrawing their 
constitutional complaints to the Constitutional Tribunal as the Tribunal had become 
34 See: Pech and Scheppele (2017), p. 3 at. p. 10.
35 See: Wyrzykowski (2019), p. 417–420.
36 It concerned judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal declaring that the Acts amending the law on the 
Constitutional Tribunal were unconstitutional. The Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment of 9 March 2016 
stipulated that the amendment of the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal from December 2015, promoted 
by the PiS party, was unconstitutional. Also the judgment of 11 August 2016 stated that the new law on 
the Criminal Code of 22 July 2016 was partly unconstitutional.
37 See: Wyrzykowski (2019), pp. 417–420.
38 See, the Constitutional Tribunal judgments of 3 December 2015, K 34/15, and of 9 December 2015, 
K 35/15.
39 See, statement of Morawski Lech at the University of Oxford: https ://www.youtu be.com/watch 
?v=3p5eg ncsjm 4.
40 See, http://konst ytucy jny.pl/esper ci-funda cji-bator ego-bezpo dstaw ne-zawie szeni e-sedzi ow-tk-w-orzek 
aniu/.
41 With there being doubts as to the lawfulness of her election.
42 https ://www.iusti tia.pl/2229-stano wisko -iusti tii-w-spraw ie-dzial an-rzecz nika-praw-obywa telsk ich-dr-
adama -bodna ra.
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nothing more than a facade institution. At present, nobody in their right mind would 
see the Constitutional Tribunal as a guardian of the Constitution but rather as a 
highly politicised body.43 In 2016 prosecutors commenced proceedings concerning 
the Prime Minister’s refusal to publish verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal. The 
prosecutors responsible for this case were changed on two occasions. Finally, the 
Minister of Justice achieved the desired result and the case was discontinued. In the 
decision published on 10 February 2017 the prosecutor argued that the Prime Min-
ister – although he was obliged by the Constitution to publish all verdicts by the 
Constitutional Tribunal – may have had justified concerns that the publication of 
those rulings would be illegal. A former president of the Constitutional Tribunal, 
Marek Safjan, noted that this was the point when the rule of law came to an end in 
Poland.44 By early 2017 the Tribunal was firmly under the control of the ruling party 
(the Law and Justice (PiS) party). Over the past 5 years the Republic of Poland has 
been losing its internal state sovereignty.45
The government’s next plans were as follows: to target how judges and prosecu-
tors are trained; how the ordinary courts operate; and how judges are promoted, dis-
ciplined and dismissed. The focus shifted to the National School of Judges and Pros-
ecutors, the Polish National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ), the ordinary courts and 
finally the Supreme Court. All of these goals have been achieved. The laws that have 
been enacted and which amend the laws on the Supreme Court46 and the National 
Council of the Judiciary47 have introduced further mechanisms for destroying the 
autonomy of the courts,48 including extraordinary complaints, the new structure of 
the Supreme Court and last but not least, disciplinary proceedings.
A series of laws have been enacted, including as from January 2018 a law con-
cerning the Polish Council for the Judiciary (KRS). The above-mentioned laws stip-
ulate that it is the Sejm which will elect judges as members of the KRS. This is in 
violation of the constitutional principles of the independence and separateness of the 
judiciary. Taking into consideration the fundamental defectiveness of the proposed 
mechanism for appointing judges to the KRS, it does not matter whether Parliament 
elects by a simple or a qualified (three-fifths) majority. It should be stressed that 
the KRS is meant to ensure the independence of the courts and the impartiality of 
judges (Art. 186 Polish Constitution). The composition of the KRS cannot depend 
solely on the decision of the remaining two branches of power. This is why the Con-
stitution clearly limits the number of KRS members elected by representatives of 
43 Markiewicz (2018), pp. 26–27; Wyrzykowski (2019), p. 418.
44 Quoted in Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A case study of Anti-constitutional 
populist backsliding. p. 30.
45 Wyrzykowski, (2019), p. 418.
46 Act of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court (Dz. U. of 2018, item 5).
47 Act of 8 December 2017 amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and some other 
acts (Dz.U. of 2018, item 3).
48 I have based the above comments on the position of the “Iustitia” Association of Polish Judges: https 
://www.iusti tia.pl/stref a-wewne trzna /stref a-wiedz y/opini e/1942-opini a-stowa rzysz enia-iusti tia-o-prezy 
denck im-proje kcie-ustaw y-o-sadzi e-najwy zszym and https ://www.iusti tia.pl/stref a-wewne trzna /stref 
a-wiedz y/opini e/1939-opini a-stowa rzysz enia-iusti tia-o-prezy denck im-proje kcie-ustaw y-o-zmian ie-ustaw 
y-o-krajo wej-radzi e-sadow nictw a-oraz-niekt orych -innyc h-ustaw .
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the executive (the President) and the legislative branch. The Minister of Justice (in 
Poland the Minister of Justice is also the Prosecutor General) is also a member of the 
Council.49 Such a solution is in line with Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the 
Committee of Ministers on the independence, responsibility and efficiency of judges 
which in para. 27 stipulates that “not less than half the members of such councils 
should be judges chosen by their peers.”50 Particular attention should be also paid to 
the fact that this law put a stop to the constitutional tenure of the KRS (Art. 6 Act on 
the National Council of the Judiciary) and introduced a joint four-year term in office 
for the members of the Council chosen from among judges (Art. 9a para. 1 Act on 
the National Council of the Judiciary). In the reasons for the bill, it was indicated 
that the criticised interim provisions respect the principle of the continuity of a con-
stitutional body because the term of office of the present members of the Council 
shall expire on the date of the first day of the joint tenure of the new KRS mem-
bers. In March 2018 the terms of all 15 serving judge-members were prematurely 
terminated, to be replaced by 15 judge-members chosen by parliamentary majority. 
In the end only 18 judges were even put forward for the NCJ as candidates. Since 
the amendment of the Law on the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) which 
entered into force in April 2018, 15 judge-members of the NCJ have been elected 
by parliamentary majority (previously they were elected by judges). In practice the 
number of professional and personal connections of present judge-members of the 
NCJ to the Ministry of Justice is so high that the newly-created body constitutes 
another body of the executive authority. If we add to that the 6 members elected by 
Parliament, the representative of the President and the representative of the Minister 
of Justice it turns out that 23 of the 25 members of the NCJ are going to be either 
elected or appointed by politicians. Therefore the KRS is in blatant violation of the 
rule to safeguard the independence of the Judiciary, to defend the Judiciary, as well 
as individual judges. The KRS undermines the application of EU law as to the inde-
pendence of judges and tribunals, and thus also its effectiveness. For example: in 
a resolution of 23 January 2020 the Polish Supreme Court (the Grand Chamber of 
all the judges of three divisions) concluded that the Disciplinary Chamber did not 
satisfy the CJEU test of being an independent tribunal. It also decided that the KRS 
is not independent from the Executive. In a direct response to this judgement, the 
KRS has actively supported the disciplinary prosecution of judges who apply the 
CJEU test (see also the answer to question 9 in the letter of 13 March 2020). The 
first judgement in such a case has been delivered: a judge (Pawel Juszczyszyn) has 
been suspended from his judicial duties indefinitely. On 14 February 2020 further 
legislation was enacted in Poland. Under Article 107 of this law judges are liable 
to disciplinary procedures if they are adjudged to have engaged in political activity, 
49 See: Markiewicz (2018), pp. 28–30.
50 See, the Final Opinion of the ODIHR on the bill on the amendment to the Act on the National Council 
of the Judiciary and some other acts (http://www.iusti tia.pl/image s/pliki /KRS/opini aOBWE konc.pdf) as 
well as the Opinion of Amnesty International on the threat to the independence of courts and impartiality 
of judges. It is stressed in both of the opinions that the proposed changes are in violation of the interna-
tional and regional recommendations in which it is stated that member of councils of the judiciary should 
be elected by the judiciary.
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such as protesting against the reforms, applying European Law as to the independ-
ence of judges and tribunals, and for submitting questions to the CJEU. The KRS is 
very much in favour of this law, and openly supports it. On 17 September 2018, an 
Extraordinary General Assembly of the ENCJ decided to suspend the membership 
of the KRS because it no longer meets the ENCJ requirement of being independent 
from the Executive and Legislature in a manner which ensures the independence of 
the Polish Judiciary (position paper added). Only the Polish Council for the Judici-
ary (KRS) voted against its own suspension. On 17 May 2020 the Board proposed to 
the General Assembly of the ENCJ, which will convene as soon as the corona crisis 
allows it to do so, that the Polish Council for the Judiciary (KRS) be expelled as a 
member of the network.
The politicians presently governing Poland have introduced changes which more 
or less amount to increased political oversight of the courts, with a significant limi-
tation of the role of the professional self-governing corporation of judges. This is 
just as it was in communist Poland when the Ministry of Justice had special rights 
to dismiss judges without restriction by shortening the terms of office of the presi-
dents of the courts or other functions, and to appoint people of their own choice in 
their place. All of the authority to appoint presidents of the courts at all levels has 
now been granted to the Minister of Justice, simultaneously stripping the organs of 
the professional self-governing bodies of the judiciary of any competences in this 
respect (Arts. 23–25 of the Act: Law on the organisation of the common courts51). 
The new way of appointing the presidents of the courts is a departure from the 
standards as presented in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal and a vio-
lation of the constitutional principle of the separateness and autonomy of the judicial 
authority (Art. 178 para. 1 Polish Constitution).52 As many as 130 court presidents 
have been removed from office thus far.53 They have been informed of the fact by 
fax or courier mail, and the notifications were dated before the time of their receipt. 
Usually they were sent either on a Friday afternoon or when the judges were on 
holiday and they only learnt of this from the media. Their replacements were often 
“clerk judges” from either the Ministry of Justice or other courts, in which they had 
not adjudicated. Moreover, there is now also the controlling authority granted to the 
Minister of Justice and his subordinates. The Ministry is to exercise oversight of 
the courts via “a supervisory service consisting of judges delegated to the Ministry 
of Justice pursuant to Art. 77.” There are over 160 of them, with the number con-
tinuously increasing as judges who are willing to cooperate with the authorities are 
rewarded with such an appointment. At the same time, “fast promotion tracks” have 
51 The Act on the organisation of the common courts in the amended wording introduced by means of 
the Act of 12.7.2017 Dz.U. z 2017 r. poz. 1452 zm; hereinafter Law on the organisation of the common 
courts.
52 The Constitutional Tribunal clearly concluded that the Minister of Justice, as the administrator of all 
courts, must undoubtedly have an important impact also on the process of appointing court presidents; 
however, his voice cannot be the dominant one (Cf. the Constitutional Tribunal ruling of 9 November 
1993 in case K 11/93, and the judgment of 18 February 2004 in case K 12/03).
53 The list is available at: https ://www.iusti tia.pl/infor macja -publi czna/2223-decyz je-kadro we-w-sadac 
h-ad-2018-ujawn iamy-pelne -zesta wieni e.
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been introduced, i.e. an accelerated means of promotion leapfrogging over one tier 
of the courts, namely moving directly from the district courts to the courts of appeal 
(Art. 64 Law on the organisation of the common courts).54 Taking into considera-
tion the career promotion procedure, and in particular the determining role of the 
National Council of the Judiciary, one can expect fast promotion tracks for candi-
dates supported by the party presently in power, which can create a serious risk of 
the career promotion process becoming political. These fears are well founded as 
those who are presently supported by the Ministry have been delegated to adjudi-
cate in courts two instances higher (judges from the district courts to the courts of 
appeal). This is an unprecedented situation.
The next step was a bill amending the Act on the Organization of the Ordinary 
Courts, the Act on the Supreme Court and the Act on the National Council of the 
Judiciary which was submitted on 12 December 2019, and then voted on by parlia-
mentary majority in the lower house of the Polish Parliament (Sejm) on 20 Decem-
ber 2019. It gained the well-deserved nickname of being a ‘muzzle law’, as it seems 
to be the greatest ‘achievement’ of the executive and the parliamentary majority on 
the path leading to the political subordination of the polish judiciary. This new so-
called muzzle law introduces new types of disciplinary torts for judges, politicizes 
new disciplinary proceedings against judges even more so, deprives the bodies of 
judicial self-government of any significance (e.g. they have lost the right to give 
opinions on candidates for the office of a judge and on candidates for senior judicial 
positions, as well as the right to adopt critical resolutions regarding changes to the 
justice administration), imposes an obligation on judges to disclose their affiliation 
to judicial associations (information on this will be posted on the Internet), gives the 
President the right to correct any defectiveness in the nomination procedure for a 
judge and enables the ruling party to take over the position of the First President of 
the Supreme Court by empowering each member of the General Assembly to nomi-
nate its own candidate, thereby reducing the quorum necessary for the election and 
enabling the President to nominate the temporary president of the Supreme Court 
for the election period.
After the subordination of the Public Prosecution Office, the Constitutional Court 
and the National Council of the Judiciary to the political authority, the Supreme 
Court became the last standing independent body for legal protection in Poland. 
Firstly, they have changed the method for the allocation of cases between judges 
of the Supreme Court. Contrary to the ordinary courts, where the cases are allo-
cated at random by an electronic system, in the Supreme Court they are allocated 
by the President of the Court. The next change was the creation of two entirely 
new Chambers, the members of which are chosen by the new politicized National 
Council of the Judiciary (the only requirement to become a member is 10 years of 
experience in any legal profession): they are the Disciplinary Chamber and Chamber 
54 There are district, regional and appellate courts as well as the Supreme Court. For example, a can-
didate for the KRS, a judge at a District Court in Jarosław, Rafał Puchalski, became president of the 
Regional Court in Rzeszów after returning from the Ministry of Justice, and has been delegated to the 
Court of Appeal in Rzeszów.
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of Extraordinary Claims and Public Affairs. The President of the Supreme Court, 
Prof. Malgorzata Gersdorf, the last key institution in the judicial system not fully 
controlled by the PiS government, has been replaced by a person affiliated to the 
PiS. Professor Małgorzata Manowska was appointed judge of the Supreme Court 
in a procedure that was grossly in breach of the Constitution.55 The involvement 
of an incorrectly appointed National Council of the Judiciary (a breach of Article 
179 in connection with Article 187, item 1 of the Constitution) and the absence of a 
countersignature by the Prime Minister on the announcement of the recruitment (a 
breach of Article 144, items 2 and 3 of the Constitution) has resulted in the ineffec-
tiveness of the election and nomination application submitted to the President of the 
Republic of Poland. She was then appointed First President of the Supreme Court 
by means of votes from those who were also incorrectly appointed as judges of the 
Supreme Court, despite the lack of support from the majority of the members of the 
Supreme Court Assembly and the lack of an Assembly resolution as required by the 
Constitution (a breach of Article 183, item 3 of the Constitution), with the Assem-
bly being chaired incorrectly and by unauthorized persons. As a result, this position 
was assumed by a person who was dependent on a representative of the executive 
authority.
Furthermore, the disciplinary proceedings were changed to limit the procedural 
guarantees of judges. What especially raises doubts is the change in appointing dis-
ciplinary officers. The Minister of Justice was given the arbitrary right to appoint 
the deputy disciplinary officer for judges of the common courts and his two depu-
ties.56 This disciplinary officer chose deputy disciplinary officers at the courts of 
appeal and regional courts from among the candidates presented to him by the gen-
eral assembly of judges.57 The Minister of Justice arbitrarily determined the number 
of disciplinary judges at the courts of appeal (S. 110 c of the Law on the Common 
Court System) and appointed the judges to be members of such courts. This appoint-
ment is binding (S. 82 c of the Law on the Common Court System). What is more, 
in the case of any disciplinary proceedings against any judge, the Minister of Justice 
may appoint his own ad hoc disciplinary officer (S. 112 b of the Law on the Com-
mon Court System), which excludes any previous officer and is equal to the instiga-
tion of proceedings. The prosecutor may also be a disciplinary officer, which enables 
“manual control” of all proceedings. This means that those who exercise executive 
authority can have a direct influence on who accuses and tries judges. Additionally, 
the Minister of Justice is entitled to lodge a binding objection against the decision of 
55 See: Statement by 50 Supreme Court judges: https ://www.iusti tia.pl/en/new-krs/3849-state ment-by-
50-supre me-court -judge s. See also: The position of Prof. Włodzimierz Wróbel, judge of the Criminal 
Chamber of the Supreme Court, regarding the obstruction of the SC Assembly on June 12, 2020, by 
persons appointed with the participation of the neo-NCJ to act as judges of the SC: http://themi s-sedzi 
owie.eu/mater ials-in-engli sh/the-posit ion-of-prof-wlodz imier z-wrobe l-judge -of-the-crimi nal-chamb er-
of-the-supre me-court -regar ding-the-obstr uctio n-of-the-sc-assem bly-on-june-12-2020-by-perso ns-appoi 
nted-with-the-parti cipat ion/.
56 S. 112 § 3 Law on the Common Court System.
57 S. 112 § 6 – 13 Law on the Common Court System.
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the disciplinary officer on a refusal to instigate disciplinary proceedings and against 
the decision on the discontinuance of proceedings.
Granting the Minister of Justice the right to lodge an objection leads to the situ-
ation where his position will be highly privileged with respect to other entities 
entitled to submit a request to instigate an investigation by the disciplinary officer. 
The said objection as indicated above is binding as far as the disciplinary officer is 
concerned, as well as the recommendations concerning further proceedings. This 
means that the disciplinary officer may be obliged to instigate or continue discipli-
nary proceedings even though there are no grounds for this in his opinion. What is 
more, this right is completely arbitrary, and the possibility of lodging an objection 
on an unlimited number of occasions in the same case may - in extreme cases - lead 
to a constant prolongation of a situation in which a given judge will be faced with 
disciplinary accusations. Such a solution has to be evaluated also in the context of 
another provision under which the disciplinary limitation period does not run dur-
ing the disciplinary proceedings until the day when the final and binding decision 
ending disciplinary proceedings is taken. This means that the Justice Minister has 
gained the possibility of having a significant influence on the course of discipli-
nary proceedings, meaning that certain judges are left with permanent accusations 
against them. Such a solution not only undermines the independence of the judi-
ciary but also contradicts the essence of the statute of limitations. It means that, 
in practice, with such a system of disciplinary proceedings, the Minister of Justice 
may not only instigate disciplinary proceedings against a specific judge but may also 
choose the disciplinary officers in each case, as well as personally appointing his 
own disciplinary officer to proceed against a given judge, or may leave him or her 
with Kafkaesque permanent accusations against him/her. He also has an influence 
on the appointment of disciplinary court members at first instance. The Minister of 
Justice may also challenge a decision to discontinue proceedings in cases in which 
he has submitted the petition for instigating the disciplinary proceedings and refer 
the case back to the disciplinary court. The clear conclusion is that this is an inquisi-
torial model of proceedings.
Attention should also be paid to the so-called “Panel for the Justice Minister’s 
measures taken in the disciplinary procedure against judges and assistant judges”, 
created at the Justice Ministry whose aim is to “carry out an analysis and present 
the Justice Minister’s recommendations” within the scope of the “disciplinary pro-
cedure against judges”. In practice, according to media reports the members of this 
panel have spread untrue and defamatory information about judges. As a result of 
the disclosure of the defamatory attacks58 the Panel, has been dissolved.
Lay judges have been added to the panels at the Supreme Court’s Disciplinary 
Chamber. These lay judges are elected by the Senate (the upper chamber of the Pol-
ish Parliament). This in effect means that disciplinary courts have become political. 
It should be underlined that active politicians will choose the lay judges so a social 
element decides on the disciplinary liability of judges, including their removal from 
office.
58 See: https ://euobs erver .com/justi ce/14568 5.
 K. Gajda-Roszczynialska, K. Markiewicz 
123
A separate issue also involves the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court,59 
as the court at second instance and it may be the court at first instance in disciplinary 
proceedings against judges from the ordinary courts, e.g. if they are accused of com-
mitting a crime. This Chamber has many features of a special court which does not 
fit within the catalogue of the justice administration bodies mentioned in S. 175 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. This Chamber is a fully autonomous and 
separate unit which, besides its name and location, has nothing further in common 
with the Supreme Court but only operates under its auspices. It has a separate presi-
dent whose status is so special in comparison to other presidents of other chambers 
that his rank is practically as high as the First President of the Supreme Court, and in 
certain aspects he even has wider competences (compare s. 20 of the Supreme Court 
Act in relation to S. 35 § 3 fourth sentence of the Act on the Supreme Court); he 
also has a separate budget and office.
The President of the Disciplinary Chamber not only occupies an autonomous 
position with respect to the First President of the Supreme Court but also has an 
influence on the administrative functioning of disciplinary courts at first instance. 
The President of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court not only appoints 
the presidents of the disciplinary courts for a 3-year term of office but may also dis-
miss them during their term in office based on general and unspecific grounds such 
as “a gross or persistent failure to meet professional obligations” or if “the further 
performance of the function cannot be combined for other reasons with the admin-
istration of justice”. He also may inspect the operations of the disciplinary courts 
at first instance. The President of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court 
determines, thereby arbitrarily ignoring the random choice provisions (S. 110§ 3 
LCCS), the disciplinary court that is competent to hear the case at first instance and 
this holds true for all forms of disciplinary misconduct. The Disciplinary Cham-
ber is comprised of persons appointed by the new National Council of the Judiciary 
which is considered to be a body that is dependent on the political authorities. Half 
of them are made up of former prosecutors, including a prosecutor who interrogated 
the suspect during an earlier stage of the proceedings60 and other persons affiliated 
with the political authorities. It should be added that despite the resolution on the 
joined Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of the Supreme 
Court dated 23 January 2020 finding that the DC is not a court and its decisions 
have not been binding since it was formed, members of the National Council of the 
Judiciary voted in a secret ballot on 31 January 2020 to elect 6 candidates for the 
59 For a discussion of the status of the Disciplinary Chamber see W. Wróbel, Izba dyscyplinarna jako 
sąd wyjątkowy w rozumieniu art. 175 ust. 2 konstytucji RP, Palestra 2019, no 1 - 2, p. 33, on-line ver-
sionhttps ://pales tra.pl/pl/czaso pismo /wydan ie/1-2-2019/artyk ul/izba-dyscy plina rna-jako-sad-wyjat kowy-
w-rozum ieniu -art.-175-ust.-2-konst ytucj i-rp, http://themi s-sedzi owie.eu/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2020/01/
Włodzim ierz-Wróbel_Disci plina ry-Chamb er-as-excep tiona l-court _def.pdf.
60 This refers to the situation of a woman being interrogated during the 9th month of her pregnancy. In 
2013, 6  years after a complaint had been lodged with the CJEU, the government of the Republic of 
Poland found that there was no possibility of winning the case and offered a settlement. It confirmed that 
Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibiting torture had been breached with respect 
to the accountant in question.
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Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, including persons connected with the 
so-called defamatory attacks61 and those who are simultaneously members of NCJ 
(which in many legal systems would itself give rise to the special disciplinary liabil-
ity of members of the National Council of the Judiciary). What is also specific about 
this Chamber is its ability to waive a judge’s immunity and, as mentioned above, to 
accuse judges of committing a crime. Both of these competences are now used for 
repressive purposes. In the context of the said regulations, we may state that there 
is no doubt that this body has been created in order to comply with the case law of 
CJEU and62 ECHR.63
In order to complement the disciplinary system so-called “Muzzle Law” was 
passed. This new so-called “Muzzle Law” has introduced new types of discipli-
nary torts for judges and it has politicized new disciplinary proceedings against 
judges even more so (e.g. decisions on waiving a judge’s immunity and the tem-
porary detention of a judge can only be made by the Disciplinary Chamber of the 
Supreme Court, the establishment of which was in conflict with the Constitution 
and EU law). It has introduced further changes in S. 107, 109, 110, 112, 114a, 128 
LCCS with respect to disciplinary proceedings. The changes contained therein with 
respect to disciplinary proceedings are aimed at the situation where Polish judges 
do not respect the decisions of the CJEU and SC, do not protest against a breach 
of the Constitution by the legislative and executive authorities and do not carry out 
their obligations to maintain law and order. The changes provide for new types of 
misconduct and constitute grounds for holding a judge accountable for disciplinary 
reasons, where unclear and sweeping criteria are used which do not meet the consti-
tutional requirement of acts prohibited by the law having been determined. It is even 
more striking that, in principle, these forms of misconduct (which do not constitute 
a crime) result in the judge in question being removed from the profession or trans-
ferred to another court.
In particular, S. 107 § 1 (3) LCCS provides for the liability of a judge for “actions 
questioning the existence of the professional relation of the judge, the effectiveness 
of the appointment of the judge”, “or the empowerment of the constitutional body 
of the Republic of Poland”. It leads to the judges in question being prohibited from 
sitting on the “neo-NCJ”, exercising the prerogative of the President or being elected 
as representatives of the NCJ. The sanction provided in this case is dismissal from 
office. Next in S. 107 §(4) LCCS the Sejm has introduced a disciplinary tort consist-
ing of engaging in a public activity which cannot be reconciled with the principles 
of the independence of the courts and the sovereignty of judges. The entry into force 
of this regulation means that, contrary to European standards, judges will not have 
a public right to oppose changes that affect law and order. The changes introduced 
in S. 110 of LCCS lead in fact to depriving the disciplinary courts of competences 
61 http://www.krs.pl/pl/rzecz nik-praso wy/komun ikaty /p,1/6158,komun ikat-praso wy-przew odnic zaceg 
o-krajo wej-rady-sadow nictw a.
62 See CJEU judgement of 27.02.2018 in the case of C – 64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portu-
gueses.
63 See the judgement of the ECHR dated 12.03.2019 no. 26374/18, lex no. 2630344.
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concerning the waiver of a judge’s immunity, permission to hold him criminally 
accountable and to arrest him temporarily and then to refer the case to the Discipli-
nary Chamber of the Supreme Court. So, the basic sanction for verifying the cor-
rectness of the way judges were appointed and their jurisdictional authority involves 
dismissal from office. It means that when applying European law Polish judges will 
be penalized with at least the loss of their job. Finally, the system is meant to create 
a situation where only judges who do not criticize other authorities, and do not ques-
tion the correctness of the measures taken by the other two authorities, will be left 
in Poland.
What is especially dangerous is that the most important disciplinary cases will 
be heard in both instances by the same body (a special court) and in such a case the 
penalty will in principle be dismissal from office or a transfer to another court. Such 
a body cannot be objective, is certainly not independent from other authorities and 
is not sovereign if it adjudicates in cases in which it is a priori interested in a specific 
decision, due to the way it is formed and its structure.
The Act has changed the principles for appointing deputy disciplinary officers, 
entrusting this competence to the disciplinary officers of the common courts with-
out indicating any criteria or requirements for obtaining permission, making the 
appointment decision completely arbitrary. Simultaneously the self-governing judi-
ciary and judges have been deprived of having any influence on the choice of local 
officers. This means, above all, that a system has been created where officers will 
be appointed by the disciplinary officers of the common courts who, in turn, have 
been appointed by the Justice Minister who is a politician. This change will increase 
the influence of the political authorities on the system of the disciplinary liability of 
judges.
The already existing system which has been changed as a result of the so-called 
Muzzle Law does not meet any constitutional, EU or international standards.64 All 
of the provisions in question create a mechanism for (ab)using disciplinary proceed-
ings in order to eliminate the independence of the judiciary. The political authorities 
decide on everything. In our opinion this system is a system of “organised injus-
tice”, but a legal form still exists. As Martin Krygier rightly observes, the form is 
not enough. Are the institutions as described in the books really working? Is the 
legal machinery that is in operation sufficient to allow us to speak about the rule of 
law in action? Is the rule of law independent from other principles of social life?65
64 On 8 April 2020 the CJEU ruled that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court may not 
conduct disciplinary proceedings against judges or refer them to courts which do not meet the criterion 
of independence under Union law. The ruling is in force until the CJEU renders final judgment on the 
European Commission’s complaint against the Polish government. It means that Poland must immedi-
ately suspend the application of the national provisions on the powers of the Disciplinary Chamber of the 
Supreme Court with regard to disciplinary cases concerning judges (Order of the CJEU on 8 April 2020 
in case C-791/19 R Commission v Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2020:277).
65 Kurczewski (2016), pp. 181–203.
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4  Case Study
In 2017 a disciplinary system was established under the Minister of Justice, Zbig-
niew Ziobro, to ensure that judges were subservient to the political will of the 
government. The disciplinary officer Piotr Schab and his deputies, Przemysław 
W. Radzik and Michał Lasota, have targeted judges who oppose unconstitutional 
changes to the judiciary, a judge who wore a T-shirt with the slogan “Constitution”, 
judges who have submitted preliminary questions to the EU Court of Justice, and 
judges who have delivered a verdict that is not in line with the preferences of the 
political authorities. There are currently 34 judges suffering formal persecution in 
the form of disciplinary charges after having opposed recent legislative measures 
because they undermine the rule of law in Poland, or because they have applied EU 
Court of Justice rulings. The charges may lead to suspension, a 40% loss of salary, 
and ultimately dismissal. On 4 February 2020 Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn was sus-
pended and deprived of 40% of his salary after being the first judge to implement the 
verdict of the EU Court of Justice (of 19 November 2019) establishing criteria for 
independent and impartial courts; 26 judges have suffered informal persecution in 
the form of an unjustified change of duties or a change to their place work, threats of 
disciplinary charges, anonymous public harassment by representatives of the legisla-
tive or executive authorities and there has been one case of a judge being criminally 
charged. Judge Igor Tuleya may still have his immunity waived and be tried under 
the so-called Muzzle Law established in February 2020, to be applied retroactively 
for his ruling on 18 December 2017 allowing the media to be present as he ordered 
an investigation into a Law and Justice Party vote in Parliament.66 The Minister of 
Justice willingly uses this competence, informing the public and the courts of this, 
also with the help of public media currently under the influence of the ruling party 
and through electronic and social media. Widely announced preferences and sugges-
tions concerning harsher punishment or selecting specific purposes of justice admin-
istration policy are intentionally being used so that they have a chilling effect as far 
as the judiciary is concerned. The new Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court 
ensures that such measures are being intensified. The current system of disciplinary 
proceedings already provides the executive authority - as practice shows - with the 
possibility to exert enormous pressure on judges, which poses a serious threat to the 
independence of the judiciary. These tools constitute a source for exerting undue 
influence in an area in which judges are supposed to be independent, and, as a result, 
it may even lead to making judgements “political”, as well as to the possibility of 
disciplinary sanctions depending on the content of such decisions. Such cases are 
prolific.
66 See: Report: Justice under pressure – repressions as a means of attempting to take control over the 
judiciary and the prosecution in Poland. Years 2015–2019, Ed. J. Kościerzyński, Warsaw 2020, https ://
www.iusti tia.pl/en/activ ity/infor matio ns/3724-repor t-justi ce-under -press ure-years -2015-2019.
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Let us take the case of Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn as an example.67 Judge Paweł 
Juszczyn is a District Court Judge in Olsztyn who, due to a decision by the Minister 
of Justice, was seconded to adjudicate in the Regional Court in Olsztyn where he 
heard appellate cases against decisions issued by the district courts. While hearing 
an appeal in one case68 Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn, while carrying out the statutory 
obligation to check whether the proceedings were valid and whether the adjudicat-
ing panel had been properly empanelled, thereby adhering to the judgment of the 
CJEU on 19 November 2019 in joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18, 
decided to verify the legal status of the judge who had been appointed by the neo-
NCJ and who had delivered the first-instance decision. For this purpose he asked 
the Secretary General of the Sejm Office to present the original or officially certified 
copies of documents submitted to the Sejm Office concerning candidates’ applica-
tions and the list of citizens and judges supporting candidates for members of the 
National Council of the Judiciary, as per the resolution of the Sejm of Poland dated 
6.3.2018.69 Judge Paweł Juszczyn also asked the Manager of the Sejm Office to pre-
sent the originals or officially certified copies of documents containing the declara-
tions of citizens or judges who had withdrawn their support for such candidates. 
In accordance with the judge’s request the said documents should have been sent 
to the Regional Court in Olsztyn and attached to case file no. IX Ca 1302/19 upr 
within 1 week of the request being served subject to a fine in the case of an unjusti-
fied refusal to provide all the requested documents. The documents were to be used 
for assessing, inter alia, the legal status of the body fulfilling the function of the 
National Council of the Judiciary with respect to meeting the criteria indicated in the 
CJEU judgment dated 19.11.2019 in joined cases A.K. (C-585/18), CP (C-624/18) 
and DO (C-625/18). Therefore Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn, when requesting the Sejm 
Office for the said documents, was acting under and within the limits of the law by 
applying the CJEU judgement of 19.11.2019, which was an obligation. Paweł Juszc-
zyszyn was the first Polish judge to take responsibility for enforcing this CJEU judg-
ment and his decision was met with an immediate reaction .70 On 28.11.2019 the 
deputy disciplinary officer for judges of the common courts, Michał Lasota, insti-
gated disciplinary proceedings against Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn, accusing him of 
committing the crime of an abuse of power. In the opinion of the deputy disciplinary 
officer Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn, when requesting these documents from the Sejm 
Office in order to verify the status of the new National Council of the Judiciary, had 
exceeded his competences by granting himself the authority to verify the correct-
ness, including the legality, of the election of members of the National Council of 
67 See: Justice under pressure – repressions as a means of attempting to take control over the judici-
ary and prosecution in Poland. Years 2015–2019, ed. J. Kościerzyński, Warsaw 2020, pp. 36–38, https ://
www.iusti tia.pl/image s/pliki /rapor t2020 /Rapor t_EN.pdf.
68 Case no.: IX Ca 1302/19.
69 Monitor Polski Item 276.
70 First, in a TV programme the Secretary of State at the Justice Ministry, Michał Wójcik, started to pub-
licly threaten Paweł Juszczyszyn with disciplinary proceedings. Then the Justice Minister immediately 
dismissed Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn from the delegation to the Regional Court without any substantive 
reasoning.
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the Judiciary, and, as a consequence, granting himself the authority to assess the 
decision of the President of the Republic of Poland on the appointment of the judge 
in question. The deputy disciplinary officer for judges of the common courts also 
accused Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn of presenting his own assessment of the situa-
tion to the media. Consequently, the disciplinary officer accused Judge Paweł Juszc-
zyszyn of not telling the truth about the facts in the applications in question. In turn 
the president of the District Court in Olsztyn, Maciej Nawacki, and simultaneously 
a member of the body performing the function of the National Council of the Judi-
ciary whose status was to be examined by the judge from Olsztyn, ordered Judge 
Paweł Juszczyszyn to take a temporary leave of absence. However, certain govern-
ment media and those favouring the government started a media campaign aimed at 
presenting Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn in the worst possible light. On 5.12.2019 the 
Labour and Social Insurance Chamber of the Supreme Court found that the Discipli-
nary Chamber of the Supreme Court is not a court as defined in EU law, and is not 
a court within the meaning of national law. The Labour and Social Insurance Cham-
ber also found that the current National Council of the Judiciary is not an impartial 
body, is not independent from the executive and legislative authorities, and that the 
interpretation contained in the CJEU judgement of 19.11.2019 is binding on every 
court in Poland and all the organs of state authority. So verifying the legal status of 
the judges with respect to the SC challenging the impartiality and independence of 
the National Council of the Judiciary from the legislative and executive authorities 
was indeed an obligation for the Regional Court in Olsztyn. Measures taken by the 
disciplinary officer for judges of the common courts were improper and were part 
of the general trend of prosecuting judges for the content of their judgments when 
these decisions are not convenient for the ruling party or when they adhere to Euro-
pean law, including CJEU judgements. The General Assembly of the Judges of Olsz-
tyn Region fully supported Paweł Juszczyszyn in their resolution dated 2.12.2019, 
demanding inter alia his forthwith reinstatement in the position which he held, and 
condemned the measures taken by the political authority, the disciplinary officers 
and the president of the District Court in Olsztyn, thereby demanding the immediate 
dismissal of the disciplinary officers in question.71 On 4 February 2020 the Disci-
plinary Chamber sitting in the Supreme Court building and consisting of three per-
sons took a decision to suspend Judge Paweł Juszczyn and to reduce his remunera-
tion by 40% pending the disciplinary hearing. Therefore this three-person chamber 
changed the earlier decision of the Disciplinary Chamber with another composition 
which did not allow Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn to be suspended. Lawyers represent-
ing Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn, although they were physically present in the Supreme 
Court building on 4.02.2020, did not enter the courtroom as this would amount to 
legitimizing the disciplinary chamber and its members. Next Judge Maciej Nawacki, 
who is a member of the politicised body performing the role of National Council of 
the Judiciary (the neo-NCJ) and is simultaneously the President of the District Court 
71 See: Communiqué of the Disciplinary prosecutor of common court judges Piotr Schab on initiating 
disciplinary proceedings against Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn; judgment of the Supreme Court of 5.12.2019 
issued in case III PO 7/18; judgment of the CJEU of 19.11.2019 in joined cases.
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in Olsztyn having been nominated by the Minister of Justice, declared that he would 
carry out the decision of the disciplinary chamber. On 5.02.2020 Maciej Nawacki, 
in the presence of reporters from the TVN TV network, signed an order under which 
he suspended the inflow of cases to Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn during the period of 
his suspension and he also blocked his access to the court’s IT systems, his elec-
tronic passes to the court building and areas except for the judge’s own room, as 
well as placing a ban on giving him keys to any courtrooms and on his entry to the 
court outside of his working hours. Cases currently being heard by Paweł Juszc-
zyszyn were referred to other judges.
Judge Igor Tuleya has repeatedly spoken in public about the state of the rule of 
law in Poland and in his statements he has always boldly defended the independence 
of the courts, the independence of judges and the principle of a democratic state 
subject to the rule of law, thereby openly criticising the unconstitutional changes 
introduced in the area of justice by those currently in power. Judges regularly meet 
with citizens in meetings on the rule of law, judicial independence, the independ-
ence of judges, the principle of the democratic rule of law and human rights. Judge 
Igor Tuley is also the instigator of a preliminary question to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union concerning the compatibility of Polish law with European 
law. As in the case of Judge Ewa Maciejewska from Łódź, the deputy disciplinary 
prosecutor for judges of the common courts, Michał Lasota, called on Judge Igor 
Tuleya to make a written statement concerning possible “judicial excessiveness”. In 
the opinion of the disciplinary prosecutor, the Polish court’s request to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of Polish 
law in the area of justice with European Union law may constitute grounds for ini-
tiating disciplinary proceedings. Judge Igor Tuleya’s educational and civic activities 
and judicial activity as a judge were met with a systemic response from the discipli-
nary prosecutor.72
Judge Waldemar Żurek has also repeatedly spoken in public on the state of the 
rule of law in Poland, and in his statements he has always boldly defended the inde-
pendence of the courts, the independence of judges and the principle of a demo-
cratic state subject to the rule of law, thereby openly criticising the unconstitutional 
changes introduced in the area of justice by those currently in power. In January 
2018, Judge Waldemar Żurek was dismissed from his position as the spokesman 
of the Regional Court in Kraków with regard to civil cases. In July 2018, Judge 
Waldemar Żurek was transferred from the 2nd Civil Appeal Division to the 1st 
72 See: Letter from the deputy disciplinary officer for Common Court Judges Michał Lasota of 9.8.2018, 
RDSP 712-2/18 calling for a written statement within 14 days; Letter from the deputy disciplinary officer 
for common court judges Judge Michał Lasota dated 14.8.2018, RDSP 712-3/18 calling for a written 
statement within 14 days, letter from the deputy disciplinary prosecutor for judges of the common courts, 
Judge Przemysław W. Radzik of 5.9.2018, RDSP 714-61/18; legal opinion of Prof. Katarzyna Dudka on 
the scope of application of Article 114 § 2 of the Act of 27.7.2001. – Law on the common courts system 
(t. one: Journal of Laws of 2018, item 23); letter from the deputy disciplinary officer for judges of the 
common courts, Judge Przemysław W. Radzik, 8.10.2018, RDSP 712-12/18, calling for a written state-
ment within 14 days; letter from the deputy disciplinary officer for judges of the common courts, Judge 
Przemysław W. Radzik, 8.10.2018, RDSP 712-13/18, calling for a written statement within 14 days.
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Civil Division (1st instance), which was criticized by “Themis” (the Association of 
Judges) and “Iustitia” (the Association of Polish Judges), which described this deci-
sion as being politically motivated harassment of this judge and as an attempt to 
intimidate judges who openly act against actions aimed at political subordination to 
justice. Judge Waldemar Żurek had taken part in meetings with citizens, where cur-
rent changes concerning the justice system, including the independence of the courts 
judges, were discussed. Judge Waldemar Zurek’s activities were met by a reaction 
from the disciplinary officer.73
Another example is the situation of the Judges of the Court of Appeal in Kato-
wice, Aleksandra Janas and Irena Piotrowska. Judges Aleksandra Janas and Irena 
Piotrowska adjudicate appeal cases at this Court of Appeal. While examining an 
appeal against the judgment of the Gliwice regional court in a divorce case, the 
judges decided to examine the legal status of the judge sitting in the court who had 
issued the decision at first instance. To this end, on 11 December 2019, judges Alek-
sandra Janas and Irena Piotrowska decided to submit a legal question to the Supreme 
Court. The judges requested an answer to the question of whether it could have 
been be considered as a duly composed court if the adjudicating judge had been 
appointed by the new, politicized National Council of the Judiciary. Deciding on the 
status of a judge issuing a ruling is crucial to resolving a case. If the composition 
of the adjudicating court is contrary to provisions of law, this results in the invalid-
ity of the proceedings. The decision issued by judges Aleksandra Janas and Irena 
Piotrowska aimed to assess, among other things, the legal status of the body per-
forming the function of the National Council of the Judiciary in terms of meeting the 
criteria set out in the judgment of the CJEU of 19 November 2019 in joint cases AK 
(C-585/18), CP (C-624/18) and DO (C-625/18). Thus, judges Aleksandra Janas and 
Irena Piotrowska, by submitting a legal question to the Supreme Court, had acted 
on the basis and within the limits of the law, thereby applying the judgment of the 
CJEU of 19 November 2019, which they were obliged to do so. Aleksandra Janas 
and Irena Piotrowska together with judge Paweł Juszczyszyn are all judges who have 
taken responsibility for the implementation of the CJEU judgment of 19 November 
2019, and this was met with the immediate reaction of a closed disciplinary/clerical 
system created by the politicians in power in Poland, which has always had one goal 
– to take control of the courts.74 On 15 December 2019, the Deputy Disciplinary 
Officer for Judges of the Common Courts, Przemysław Radzik, initiated discipli-
nary proceedings against judges Aleksander Janas and Irena Piotrowska, accusing 
them of committing the crime of an abuse of power. According to the deputy dis-
ciplinary officer, judges Aleksandra Janas and Irena Piotrowska had exceeded their 
73 See: Letter from the deputy disciplinary prosecutor for judges of the common courts, Judge 
Przemysław W. Radzik, 8.10.2018, RDSP 712-13/18; The decision of the deputy disciplinary prosecu-
tor for judges of the common courts, judge Michał Lasota, of 22.11.2018 issued in the case of RDSP 
712-14/18 on the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the judge of the District Court Waldemar 
Żurek and the presentation of charges for disciplinary offences.
74 See: Report: Justice under pressure – repressions as a means of attempting to take control over the 
judiciary and the prosecution in Poland. Years 2015–2019, Ed. J. Kościerzyński, Warsaw 2020, p. 73, 
https ://www.iusti tia.pl/en/activ ity/infor matio ns/3724-repor t-justi ce-under -press ure-years -2015-2019.
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powers, granting themselves the competence to assess how the new National Coun-
cil of the Judiciary works in the way that it selects some Justices and using repres-
sion as a method to take control of this body and how specific judges are appointed 
with the participation of the new National Council of the Judiciary. Przemysław 
Radzik, the deputy disciplinary officer, determined that the legal question submitted 
to the Supreme Court by judges Aleksandra Janas and Irena Piotrowska amounted to 
unlawful interference in the statutory manner of appointing judges to adjudication 
panels. Then, on 18 December 2019, Przemysław W. Radzik submitted applications 
to the Disciplinary Chamber operating at the Supreme Court for the suspension 
of judges Aleksandra Janas and Irena Piotrowska from their official duties with a 
25–50% reduction in their remuneration for the duration of this suspension.75 Judges 
Aleksandra Janas and Irena Piotrowska not only had the right but also the obligation 
to examine the legal status of a judge who had been appointed with the participation 
of the new National Council of the Judiciary, which clearly follows from the judg-
ment of the CJEU of 19 November 2019 regarding criteria for assessing the status 
of the Disciplinary Chamber and the National Council of the Judiciary, issued in 
joined cases AK (C-585/18), CP (C-624/18) and DO (C-625/18). On 5 December 
2019 the Supreme Court’s Chamber of Labour and Social Security found that the 
Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court is not a court within the meaning of 
EU law, and is thus not a court within the meaning of national law. In addition, the 
Chamber of Labour and Social Security stated that the current National Council of 
the Judiciary is not an impartial body that is independent from the executive and 
legislative authorities. Further, it indicated that the interpretation contained in the 
judgment of the CJEU of 19 November 2019 binds every court in Poland, as well 
as any state authority. Therefore, an investigation into the legal status of judges in 
connection with the Supreme Court challenging the impartiality and independence 
of the National Council of the Judiciary from the legislative and executive authori-
ties was indeed the responsibility of the Regional Court in Olsztyn. However, the 
actions of the deputy disciplinary officer Przemysław Radzik are unacceptable and 
are part of the observed general trend for prosecuting judges for the content of their 
judgments when these judgments are inconvenient for those in power, as well as 
for applying European law, including respecting the judgments of the CJEU All of 
these examples demonstrate how, in practice, the changed model of disciplinary pro-
ceedings is already being used to break the rule of law. In turn, the application of 
these measures against judges Aleksandra Janas, Irena Piotrowska, Paweł Juszczyn, 
Waldemar Żurek and Igor Tuleya is an example of the instrumental use of law by 
the disciplinary officer in order to have a freezing effect on the judiciary. It is also a 
blatant example of an abuse of power by officers for political purposes.
75 See: Announcements by the Disciplinary Officer of the General Court Judges Piotr Schab on 15 
and 18 December 2019 regarding the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against judges Aleksandra 
Janas and Irena Piotrowska; Supreme Court judgment of 5 December 2019 issued in case III PO 7/18; 
judgment of the CJEU of 19 November 2019 in joined cases AK (C-585/18), CP (C-624/18) and DO 
(C-625/18).
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5  The CJEU Judgement of 19 November 2019 in Joined Cases 
C‑585/18, C‑624/18, and C‑625/18
As a result of doubts which appeared with regard to disciplinary proceedings, 
applications for a preliminary ruling on their interpretation were submitted by the 
Supreme Court. In the application for a preliminary ruling on interpretation in 
the case C-585/18 and in the second and third applications in cases C-624/18 and 
C-625/18, the court wanted to determine whether Arts. 2 and 19(1) (par. 2) TEU, 
Art. 267 TFEU and Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be inter-
preted in such a way that the chamber of the highest court of a member state, such 
as the Disciplinary Chamber, which is to adjudicate in matters that are subject to 
EU law, meets, with respect to the conditions on which it was established and on 
which its members were appointed, the requirements of independence and impartial-
ity required on the basis of EU law. If this is not the case, the court asked whether 
the principle of EU primacy should be interpreted in such a way that it requires the 
court to waive the application of national provisions reserving the competence for 
hearing such cases to the said court chamber. The basic doubts concerned whether 
in the light of the national provisions concerning the formation of a specific body, 
such as the Disciplinary Chamber, and defining in particular the competence held 
by it, its composition and conditions and principles for appointing judges sitting in 
the chamber, as well as the conditions and principles on which they were appointed, 
such a body and its members meet the requirements of independence and impartial-
ity which a court must meet under Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights if 
it adjudicates in a dispute in which the individual alleges a breach of EU law, as in 
this case. In this respect the CJEU is some kind of supreme court, assuming that 
the national courts co-share adjudication with the CJEU, being peculiar “common 
courts with respect to CJEU”, due to the decentralization of the application of EU 
law. The national courts play a leading role in maintaining the rule of law in the 
EU in cooperation with the Court of Justice, acting under national laws but also 
under European law in order to ensure that individuals have the effective rights to 
which they are entitled.76 By adopting this concept the CJEU assumed that this issue 
should be finally settled by the national court, after it completes all of its necessary 
findings. In this respect the CJEU reiterated that Art. 267 TFEU does not authorize 
the CJ to apply EU laws in a given case, but only to adjudicate on the interpretation 
of treaties and acts adopted by EU institutions. In accordance with determined case 
law on courts’ cooperation the CJ may, on the basis of the information contained 
in the case files, provide the national court with guidance as to the interpretation 
of EU law which may be useful for it while assessing the consequences of a given 
provision of this law.77 The CJ makes its interpretation on the basis of European law, 
and on the basis of national law this interpretation is left to the referring court - the 
Supreme Court. In its decision the CJ has formulated clear criteria which should be 
76 See. Lenaerts (2020), p. 30.
77 As in: judgement dated 16  July 2015, CEZ Razpredelenie Byłgarija, C-83/14, EU:C:2015:480, 
point 71 and the case law quoted therein.
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taken into account while assessing whether a judicial body is a court and its mem-
bers meet the criteria of independence and impartiality resulting from Art. 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Above all it was underlined that all the facts 
connected with the appointment of judges of the disciplinary chamber should be 
assessed. The fact that members of the Disciplinary Chamber are appointed by the 
President of Poland cannot mean that such members are dependent on the political 
authorities or raise doubts as to their impartiality, if after their appointment they are 
not under pressure and do not receive any instructions while performing their duties 
.78 The role of the NCJ is also important. Irrespective of the assessment of the cir-
cumstances in which the new judges of the Disciplinary Chamber were appointed 
and the role which the NCJ plays in this aspect, the court should also determine 
other factors characterizing this body in a more direct way, such as e.g. the scope of 
its competences and its systemic role.79 In this context the CJ paid attention to the 
fact that under S. 131 of the new Act on the Supreme Court the Disciplinary Cham-
ber may only be comprised of newly appointed judges, with the exclusion of judges 
who have already served as Supreme Court judges. The CJ noted that although the 
Disciplinary Chamber was formed as a chamber of the Supreme Court, contrary to 
other chambers forming this court it seems to have an exceptionally high degree 
of autonomy within the framework of this court and this is mostly the result of S. 
20 of the new Act on the Supreme Court. The CJ underlined that the conglomerate 
of these circumstances analysed jointly may lead to the conclusion that it is not a 
court within the meaning of Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, espe-
cially if the said examination concerning the NCJ revealed that this body lacked 
independence from the legislative and executive authorities. So the CJEU ordered 
the national court to carry out such an assessment, taking into account, if neces-
sary, specific reasons or purposes which will be touched upon before this court in 
order to justify certain disputed measures, whether the concurrence of the factors 
mentioned in points 143–151 of this judgment and all other duly proved important 
facts about which the court will be informed may raise in the opinion of individu-
als justified doubts as to the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber from the 
external factors, in particular from the direct or indirect influence of the legislative 
and executive authorities, and its neutrality with respect to a conflict of interests, and 
accordingly lead to a lack of independence or impartiality, which could undermine 
the trust which the judiciary should have in the eyes of individuals in a democratic 
society. As a result the CJEU stated that if this court came to the conclusion that this 
78 See also the judgement dated 31  January 2013, D. and A., C-175/11, EU:C:2013:45, point   99; 
and also the decisions of the ECHR dated 28   June 1984 in Campbell and Fell v. the United King-
dom, CE:ECHR:1984:0628JUD000781977, § 79; dated 2  June 2005  in the case of Zolotas v. Greece, 
CE:ECHR:2005:0602JUD003824002, §§ 24, 25; dated 9 November 2006 in the case of Sacilor Lorm-
ines v. France, CE:ECHR:2006:1109JUD006541101, § 67; and also dated 18 October 2018 in the case of 
Thiam versus France, CE:ECHR:2018:1018JUD008001812, § 80 and the case law quoted therein.
79 In this respect it should be reiterated that in the judgement dated 24 June 2019 Commission/Poland 
(Independence of the Supreme Court)(C 619/18, EU:C:2019:531), the CJ found that due to the adoption 
of the said measures the Republic of Poland had breached the irremovability and independence of the 
judges of the Supreme Court and had failed to perform its obligations under Art. 19(1)(2nd par.) TEU.
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is indeed the case, it would mean that such a body would not meet the requirements 
resulting from Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 9(1) of direc-
tive 2000/78, as it would not be an independent and impartial court within the mean-
ing of these regulations.
6  The Resolution of the Combined Civil, Criminal and Labour 
and Social Insurance Chambers of the Supreme Court Dated 23 
January 2020, Case BSA I‑4110‑1/20
As a result of the CJEU judgment the following judgments of the Supreme Court 
were delivered: 5 December 2019,80 and (II PO 8/18, III PO 9/18). The SC also 
decided on specific individual cases forming the basis of applications for a prelimi-
nary ruling on interpretation. The Supreme Court, taking into account the standards 
and principles for assessing the independence of the body and the sovereignty of 
judges, determined that the NCJ and the Disciplinary Chamber of the SC were bod-
ies that lacked independence and sovereignty. In interpreting the SC case law there 
was a discrepancy in the issues covered by the consequences of the CJEU judgment 
dated81 19.11.2019. As a result of the discrepancy in the resolution by the combined 
Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of the Supreme Court 
dated 23 January 2020, case file no. BSA I-4110-1/20, at the request of the First 
President of the Supreme Court dated 15 January 2020 on solving the discrepancy 
in the interpretation of the law in the case law of the Supreme Court, it adopted a 
resolution under which an improper composition of the court under S. 439 § 1(2) of 
CrPC or the composition of the court being in non-compliance with the provisions 
of the law as defined in S. 379(4) of the CivPC will also occur if the composition of 
the court includes a person appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court at the request 
of the National Council of the Judiciary in the manner defined in the provisions of 
the Act dated 8 December 2017 on a Change to the Act on the National Council 
of the Judiciary and Certain Other Acts (Dz.U. of 2018 item 3). In the opinion of 
the Supreme Court an improper composition as defined in S. 439 § 1 (2) of CrPC 
or the non-compliance of the court’s composition with the provisions of the law as 
defined in S. 379(4) CivPC also occurs if the court’s composition involves a person 
appointed to be a judge in a common or military court at the request of the National 
Council of the Judiciary as as defined by the provisions of the Act dated 8 December 
2017 on a Change to the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and Certain 
Other Acts (Dz.U. of 2018 item 3) and if the defects in the appointment process lead 
in certain circumstances to a breach of the standard of independence and impartial-
ity as defined in S. 45(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Art. 6(1) 
of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
In the opinion of the Supreme Court the interpretation of S. 439 § 1(2) of the CrPC 
and S. 37(4) of the CivPC adopted in points 1 and 2 of this resolution does not apply 
80 Case file no.: III PO 7/18.
81 III PO7/18, I NOZP 3/19 (7), II DSI 17/18, III KO154/18, III KZP 4/19.
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to judgements issued by the courts before it was adopted and to judgements which 
are still pending under the Code of Criminal Procedure before a given composition 
of the court. Point 1 of this resolution applies to judgments issued with the par-
ticipation of the judges of the Disciplinary Chamber formed at the Supreme Court 
under the Act dated 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court (Dz.U. of 2018 item 
5 as amended) irrespective of when they were issued.82 The resolution by the com-
bined Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of the Supreme 
Court dated 23 January 2020 was the result of the reaction to the preliminary rul-
ing concerning interpretation delivered by the CJEU on 19 November 2019 in com-
bined cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18, where an interpretation of EU law 
concerning the standards of independence and sovereignty pertaining the bodies, 
as required by S. 47 of CFREU and Art. 19 TEU, was presented. Moreover, the 
interpretation by the Supreme Court has erga omnes effect across the EU, which 
means that not only the CJEU but nearly all the national bodies are obliged to loy-
ally implement this judgement (Art. 4(3) TEU).83
To begin with, a few formal issues should be underlined. The issue to be deter-
mined was not the issue of presidential prerogatives, the issue of the legislative com-
petence of the Supreme Court or the constitutional understanding of the principle of 
the separation of powers.84 The resolution does not constitute law and is not an act of 
law in a strict sense. As a consequence, there were no grounds for the Sejm Speaker 
to submit an application to settle the dispute concerning competence between the 
Supreme Court and the Polish Sejm and between the President of Poland and the 
Supreme Court (case file no. Kpt 1/20) as there is no real dispute as such and the 
decision is inadmissible so the proceedings as a whole should have been discontin-
ued. In the opinion of the Supreme Court both the circumstances surrounding its 
submission and the content of the justification leave no doubt that in fact we are 
here dealing with an abuse of competence, and the application was submitted in bad 
82 The resolution of the combined Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of the 
Supreme Court dated 23 January 2020, Case BSA I-4110-1/20, publ. http://www.sn.pl/aktua lnosc i/SiteA 
ssets /Lists /Wydar zenia /AllIt ems/BSA%20I-4110-1_20_Engli sh.pdf.
83 It should be noted that in recognizing this resolution on 24 January 2020 the Supreme Court, having 
already heard the legal issue in the Civil Chamber in case file no. III CZP 94/19, refused to adopt a reso-
lution on the answer to the following legal issue: “Does the participation of the National Council of the 
Judiciary whose composition was formed as a result of the election by the Polish Sejm of fifteen judges 
in the manner described by the provisions of the Act dated 8 December 2017 on the Change to the Act 
on the National Council of the Judiciary and Certain Other Acts (Dz.U. of 2018 item 3 as amended) in 
the process of appointing a judge being a member of the adjudicating panel constitute an autonomous 
and sufficient condition to find that the composition of the court is contrary to the provisions of law as 
defined in s. 379(4) of the CivPC?” The Supreme Court indicated that on 23 January 2020 a resolu-
tion by the combined Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of the Supreme Court, 
court file no. BSA 1-4110-1/20, had been adopted. This resolution has the effect of a legal principle that 
is binding on all the adjudicating panels of the Supreme Court and in its second point it settles, in a bind-
ing way, the legal issue presented in this case, which in the light of the case law of the Supreme Court 
leads to the necessity to refuse to adopt the resolution.
84 The resolution of the combined Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of the 
Supreme Court dated 23 January 2020, Case BSA I-4110-1/20, point 12 et seq., http://www.sn.pl/aktua 
lnosc i/SiteA ssets /Lists /Wydar zenia /AllIt ems/BSA%20I-4110-1_20_Engli sh.pdf.
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faith, not to settle a real competence dispute, but only to prevent the Supreme Court 
from exercising the rights which were granted to it by the legislator.85 As a conse-
quence, the Constitutional Tribunal could not suspend the proceedings in the context 
of adopting a resolution, which was done by way of the decision dated 22 January 
2020, and also could not suspend the application of the resolution by the decision 
dated 28 January 2020 on the suspension of the application of the resolution of the 
Supreme Court dated 23 January by the time the alleged competence dispute was 
heard by the CT (case Kpt 1/20). In this context we share the opinion that the appli-
cation of the competence regulations with the purpose of controlling the resolutions 
of the SC is unlawful as it constitutes an abuse of control over constitutionality.
The resolution has a significant meaning, however, because, as a legal principle, 
it is binding on the adjudicating panels of the Supreme Court. Above all it is aimed 
at the harmonization of case law and to dispel all doubts concerning adjudication, 
and what is more significant, it aims to provide stability for the legal order. The reso-
lution is balanced and is assumed to have long-term consequences.86 Its most sig-
nificant element and general value is the finding that defectiveness in the proceed-
ings leading to the appointment of a judge translates also into the attributes of the 
court as a body administering justice. It means that the lack of a guarantee of inde-
pendence and sovereignty relating to the body prevents its jurisdictional function 
despite maintaining the formal status of a court. This is the result of the court being 
so defective that it cannot fulfil its jurisdictional function as it does not guarantee 
the right to access a court and the protection of all the other substantive rights. This 
is all the more so in light of the revealed support lists for the National Council of 
the Judiciary, which prove that the body was incorrectly formed and that the defec-
tiveness in the procedure for the appointment of judges, and its structural charac-
ter, leads to the situation where this body cannot properly perform its constitutional 
functions. The resolution differentiates the consequences of this defectiveness with 
respect to the disciplinary chamber and common court judges, making an assump-
tion that the scale and scope of the procedural consequences of the defectiveness 
in the appointment of judges depending on the type of court in which the appoint-
ment takes place and its place in the structure of the judicial bodies are different. 
What is significant here is the status of Supreme Court judges, including Discipli-
nary Chamber judges who are only made up of judges appointed for the first time by 
the challenged National Council of the Judiciary and also the fact that the Chamber 
consists of judges nominated exclusively by the challenged NCJ. In the opinion of 
the Supreme Court, appointments to the Disciplinary Chamber are not appointments 
as judges as the Disciplinary Chamber is not a court as provided for by S. 175(1) of 
the Constitution and, as an exceptional court, it is prohibited as a result of the clear 
wording of S. 175(2) of the Constitution. It has also held that decisions of this cham-
ber do not amount to court judgements as defined in S. 42(3) of the Constitution, 
85 http://www.sn.pl/aktua lnosc i/SiteP ages/Wydar zenia .aspx?ItemS ID = 601-0dc69 815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3 c6969 c5&ListN ame = Wydar zenia .
86 E. Łętowska, A wise, forward-looking resolution by the Supreme, Court: https ://ruleo flaw.pl/letow 
ska-a-wise-forwa rd-looki ng-resol ution -by-the-supre me-court /.
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and this provision, bearing in mind the presumption of innocence, applies also with 
respect to disciplinary liability. Judges cannot function without being assigned to a 
court. As a consequence, the Disciplinary Chamber is also not an European court 
within the meaning of CJEU case law. The presumption of innocence may be exclu-
sively rebutted on the basis of a court judgement - but only by a court which satis-
fies the constitutional features of such a body.87 An exceptional court (a court not 
included in the list in S. 175(1) of the Constitution) during a time of peace cannot 
be a court within the meaning of the Constitution, as this would be contrary to the 
principle of legality. As a consequence, it may not deliver judgements in the name 
of the Republic of Poland. The formation of the Disciplinary Chamber has led to the 
exclusion of many individual cases from the competences of courts as in these cases 
the possibility of lodging an appeal to the court has been excluded. Due to the char-
acter of the disciplinary decisions it is a clear breach of S. 77(2) of the Constitution 
under which the law cannot preclude individuals from taking legal action to enforce 
breached freedoms or rights. If at first instance the case was heard by the courts 
hearing constitutional matters (this relates in particular to disciplinary cases relating 
to judges), the exclusive competence of the Disciplinary Chamber to hear appel-
late measures means that in such cases the constitutional principle of two-instance 
appellate proceedings no longer applies (S. 176(1) of the Constitution).88 Currently 
we have to deal with the fact that in many disciplinary cases the right of access 
to a court has been limited and the resolution of the Supreme Court removes this 
defect from the system. The Supreme Court, as the guarantor of the rule of law, has 
ensured the elimination of proceedings which were conducted in breach of Art. 47 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Art. 6 of the Convention as well as S. 45 of 
the Constitution of the RP. Further actions by the legislative and executive authori-
ties indicate that this state of affairs has not been accepted and actions contrary to 
the judgment of the Supreme Court and the instigation of disciplinary proceedings 
in their current form must be evaluated within the context of the rule of law.
87 W. Wróbel, The Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court as an exceptional court in the meaning 
of Article 175, para. 2 of the Polish Constitution (original title: “Izba dyscyplinarna jako sąd wyjątkowy 
w świetle Article 175 ust. 2 Konstytucji RP”, “Palestra” No. 1-2/2019, an academic and socio-cultural 
magazine published by the Polish Supreme Bar Council, the article can be accessed at: http://czaso pismo 
.pales tra.pl/uploa d/15/54/10/15541 04640 _.pdf, accessed on 05/04/2019), p. 33, on-line version: http://
themi s-sedzi owie.eu/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2020/01/Włodzim ierz-Wróbel_Disci plina ry-Chamb er-as-excep 
tiona l-court _def.pdf.
88 W. Wróbel, The Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court as an exceptional court in the meaning 
of Article 175, para. 2 of the Polish Constitution (original title: “Izba dyscyplinarna jako sąd wyjątkowy 
w świetle Article 175 ust. 2 Konstytucji RP”, “Palestra” No. 1-2/2019, an academic and socio-cultural 
magazine published by the Polish Supreme Bar Council, this article can be accessed at: http://czaso 
pismo .pales tra.pl/uploa d/15/54/10/15541 04640 _.pdf, accessed on 05/04/2019), p. 33, on-line version: 
http://themi s-sedzi owie.eu/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2020/01/Włodzim ierz-Wróbel_Disci plina ry-Chamb er-as-
excep tiona l-court _def.pdf.
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7  Conclusions
So, do we have a rule of law in Poland? In our opinion Martin Krygier89 would not 
consider the current Polish legal system as one that satisfies any meaningful (or even 
formal) definition of the rule of law Three separate issues are important here.90
The first question is that of the efficacy of the law. The inefficiency of the machin-
ery of justice is a great obstacle to establishing a State of Law in Poland.91 In recent 
years the functioning of the common courts has been systematically deteriorating. 
Reforms aiming to improve the functioning of the courts have been not carried out, 
and the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly worsened this situation. The present 
situation is critical.
Secondly, the rule of law is linked with Polish democracy and its fate, and so 
major threats to the rule of law amount to threats to Polish democracy in general.92 
Nowadays, we have the dark scenario where the political class have turned into a 
democratically elected oligarchy. The problem is that we need to distinguish the rule 
of law from the welfare state, where privileged groups have a better social status. 
This better financial and social status has led to a situation in which people who con-
sidered themselves to be excluded are starting to support the populists. The populists 
created the authoritarian clientelism in Poland after 2015.93 That is why citizens and 
the authorities are “living with lies”.94
Thirdly, as the courts are the guardians of the rule of law, there is no rule of law 
without the right of access to a court. After the destruction of the institutions, the 
time has come to eliminate the judges, who are unfavourable to the populists. Disci-
plinary proceedings may create an instrument for breaking the rule of law in Poland. 
In 2017, as part of a package of legal changes to the judiciary, a disciplinary system 
was created in Poland to ensure that judges are subservient to the political will of 
the authorities. New disciplinary officers appointed by the Minister of Justice have 
targeted judges who oppose unconstitutional changes within the judiciary. Discipli-
nary proceedings are by no means the only forms of repression that affect judges 
who demand that other authorities respect the rule of law in Poland. The ongoing 
large-scale use of disciplinary proceedings against Polish judges who apply EU law 
will inevitably lead to a chilling effect and weaken the effectiveness of the law in 
the legal order. The idea of the EU as the community of law will be compromised. 
As no Polish legislation may prevent judges from other Member States applying 
the CJEU ruling of 19 November 2019, legal chaos undermining the stability of the 
EU legal order is an inevitable scenario. The system of EU law based on mutual 
trust and cooperation between the courts from all the Member States will be under a 
89 See: Kryger (2016), pp. 199–229; Krygier (2019), pp. 106–136.
90 Kurczewski (2016), pp. 181–203. See also: J. Kurczewski, “Rządy prawa” [The Rule of Law] in Res 
Publica, 3 (March) 1989.
 Kurczewski (1994); Kurczewski (1995).
91 Kurczewski (2016), pp. 181–203.
92 See: Kurczewski (1993).
93 Markowski (2019), pp. 111–132.
94 Kurczewski (2016), pp. 181–203.
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severe threat. Despite the judgment of the Supreme Court, the Disciplinary Cham-
ber is still functioning. An analysis of the recent events shows that the application 
of the resolution by the combined Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance 
Chambers of the Supreme Court dated 23 January 2020 implementing the CJEU 
judgment in joined cases dated 19 November 2019 (C-585/18, C-624/18, C-625/18) 
can be and is penalized by further disciplinary proceedings, which constitutes a real 
threat to the already weakened rule of law.
The situation of the rule of law in Poland has been dramatically aggravated over 
the last few months. The Polish government has refused to respect the recent judg-
ment by the CJEU regarding judicial independence in Poland (from November 19, 
2019) and has enacted a law aimed at preventing its implementation. Polish judges 
already face disciplinary and criminal charges for submitting preliminary questions 
to the CJEU and for following its recent judgment. The Commission filed a com-
plaint in October 2019, and in January 2020 – being especially concerned about the 
“Muzzle Law” before the Polish Parliament, which further tightened the disciplinary 
liability system – it applied for interim measures. On 8 April 2020, as a response 
to this complaint by the European Commission, the CJUE ruled that: “The Repub-
lic of Poland shall be required, immediately and pending the judgment in Case C 
791/19, to suspend the application of the provisions of Article 3(5), Article 27 and 
Article 73(1) of the Supreme Court Act of 8 December 2017 (OJ L 2018, item 5), as 
amended, which constitute the basis for the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Chamber 
of the Supreme Court in both the first and second instance, in disciplinary cases of 
judges; refrain from referring cases pending before the Disciplinary Chamber of the 
Supreme Court for consideration by a panel which does not meet the requirements 
for independence indicated in particular in the judgment of 19 November 2019, 
A.K. and others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court) 
(C 585/18, C 624/18 and C 625/18).” A new chapter in the conflict concerning the 
rule of law has begun: The PiS has openly rejected these Commission and CJEU 
decisions and appeals. What is at stake is no longer the conformity of the Polish 
judicial system with European standards but also respect for legally binding deci-
sions by EU institutions. Most importantly, on 9 June 2020 in Warsaw, the meeting 
of the Disciplinary Chamber on waiving judge Igor Tuleya’s immunity took place 
against the decision of the CJEU. The Supreme Court Disciplinary Chamber has 
not yet revoked Judge Igor Tuleya’s immunity,95 but Poland has “crossed the rubi-
con” with its first political trial of a judge, in violation of an EU court injunction.96 
The prosecutor’s office appealed against this. The three person panel of Disciplinary 
Chamber will examine this appeal on 5 October 2020 in Warsow. The rise of pop-
ulism in Poland is a real threat to democracy in Europe. If the populists will be able 
95 The National Prosecutor’s Office wants to waive the immunity of judge Igor Tuleya in order to bring 
criminal charges against him. The matter concerns his alleged failure to perform his official duties and 
exceeding his rights in connection with a judgement issued on 18 December 2017. According to the 
National Prosecutor’s Office, Tuleya unlawfully allowed journalists to hear and record him. See: https 
://ruleo flaw.pl/the-disci plina ry-chamb er-will-exami ne-the-case-of-judge -igor-tuley a-despi te-cjeu-order /.
96 See: I. Tuleya, Poland ‘crossed rubicon’ against EU court injunction: https ://euobs erver .com/justi 
ce/14860 9.
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to effectively remove judges using disciplinary actions, the rule of law in Poland will 
be destroyed. The populists will then have realized their strategy to prevent judges 
from controlling government power.
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